Coalition politics is the form in which a ‘second democratic transition’ is revealing itself in South Africa. The campaigns and contests of the local government elections of 2026 sketch the evolving character of this important phase in South African politics.
The second transition as conceptualised in this analysis relates in main to the African National Congress (ANC), the long-time dominant carrier of the country’s multi-party democracy. The ANC has been shedding voter support, gradually and relentlessly, thereby opening unprecedented spaces for new party politics to flourish. The ANC of 2026 is a small shadow of the party that rose from the liberation struggle and South Africa’s first democratic transition of the 1990s. The ANC in the 2020s did all in its power to reverse, and deny, the critical change in its status, including enlisting other political parties in governing coalitions to help shore up its support and retain control over state institutions.
The ANC continued to live in the hearts and minds of millions of South Africans but could no longer find its way into the majority’s ballot paper endorsements. There was a growing divide between the ANC as revered historical liberation party, and an ANC that was faltering both organisationally and in many governance operations (both with and without its variety of coalition partners).
Voters did not simply abandon their ANC, to fall into the lap of an opposition party, although the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) in KwaZulu-Natal may have been a ‘special type’ exception. Large numbers ‘parked’ their votes in abstention from voting or voted for inconsequential micro or community parties. In this way they could participate but not strengthen opposition directly. These ‘dinky’ parties tended to support the ANC in majority-building kingmaking processes in municipalities across the provinces.
This relates to an important aspect of this second transition: elections are just the first step to getting into power. The negotiations to form coalition governments follow. Next there are continuous contests and accommodations to keep the coalition partners on board. Staying in power in close to half of South Africa’s municipalities means there could be an election-to-election match to stay in power.
Formal coalition agreements and conflict resolution mechanisms are absent – considered by the party actors as ‘too restrictive’. Parties will remain on board because they want (shared) power and have found the arithmetic to build a council majority. The seductive rewards, which often detract from quality governance, include positions and portfolios to the leaders, favourable tender allocations to associates, guaranteed blind eyes to indiscretions, and demonstrable deliveries to identifiable constituents.
There is an ideological and aspirational poverty to this transition. The simple formula for municipal majorities (add up the seats of who and whichever is willing and get a council majority) tends to overrule ideological and policy concerns. In a highly deficient local government system, the higher-level platforms fall flat. With basic services at the forefront of delivery challenges, not even sophisticated delivery schemes gain gravitas. At the basic level only the essences of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plans (SDBIPs) are likely to enter the municipal delivery debates – and frequently not in any way that testifies to professionalism and effectiveness.
Amid these dynamics the ANC thus far has stood as often still the biggest (or ‘plurality’) party. The ANC needed to find the power in the post-election negotiations that had eluded it in the election results. The second transition will change gears if in the local government elections of 4 November 2026, the ANC’s edge over the other parties shrinks, and the party political playing field becomes more equal.
The contest has become so ingrained in most of the coalition municipalities that there will hardly be a day in the forthcoming five years in many of the coalition municipalities, and least of all in the highly contested councils run by complex coalition formations, when these non-stop power campaigns will cease. When in Coalitions Bill finally materialises, a year or two in the making, there may be restraints. But, for now, it remains work in (potential) progress.
In this second transition political power therefore comes through continuous transactions. If a governing majority can be constituted in an alternative way, by a different set of parties, there is no guarantee of power the next day. (Only the aftermath of 4 November will show whether the coalition tendencies of the main parties, as established in the 2021-2026 term, will hold or be inverted.)
This transition from dominant party governance within a multiparty democracy onto coalition governance thus constituted a major new way of operation for party politics in South Africa. Party political wars ruled instead of cooperation in government, of true acceptance that voters collectively and in effect asked for multipartyism. Contest and cooperation for now remain the two sides of South Africa’s coalition coin.
Perhaps political parties have learnt from the tumultuous 2021-2026 season; maybe they noticed the often disruptive and destructive effects of continuous contest, the cynicism, desperation and the withdrawal of the voters.
There is a modest possibility that parties will become more mature in their coalition behaviours. Maturity will mean that they remain in a particular coalition relationship for longer, interparty cooperation becomes the predominant modus operandi, and governance is defined by its substantive developmental effect. If this happens, the second transition may evolve to become a meaningful part of the evolution of democracy in South Africa.